

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 BONN 10475 01 OF 02 231450Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----058988 231459Z /42

O P 231439Z JUN 77  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9286  
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY  
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY  
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 10475

EXDIS

PARIS FOR THE SECRETARY

GENEVA FOR SEABED DEL - SLOSS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS CINC EUR VAIHINGEN AND USNMR SHAPE

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR  
SUBJECT: REPORT ON DIRECT SOVIET-FRG CONTACT REGARDING  
MBFR

REFS: (A) BONN 10391, (B) MBFR VIENNA 33L

1. A WEST GERMAN INTELLECTUAL HAS TOLD US A VERY STRANGE  
STORY IN WHICH HE ACTED AS INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE  
SOVIETS AND THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING CERTAIN  
ITEMS UNDER DISCUSSION IN MBFR.

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2. ACCORDING TO THE PROFESSOR, WHO IS IN THE MODERATE-  
CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL SPECTRUM AND ALSO HEADS A GERMAN  
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SOVIET OFFICIALS RECENTLY APPROACHED  
HIM TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

--THE SOVIET UNION FULLY UNDERSTANDS WHY THE  
GERMANS INSIST ON COLLECTIVE RATHER THAN NATIONAL CEIL-

INGS. THE PROBLEM FOR THE SOVIETS IS THAT THEY DO NOT WANT TO SEE INCREASES IN GERMAN FORCES ON EVERY HALFWAY SUITABLE PRETEXT.

--THE SOVIETS ALSO UNDERSTAND THE WESTERN INSISTENCE ON PARITY. THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THIS PRINCIPLE BUT CAN NEVER HAVE EXACTLY THE SAME NUMBER OF FORCES AS THE WEST BECAUSE OF THEIR ALLEGED ADDITIONAL TEN PER CENT USED FOR LOGISTICS PURPOSES. SOME FORMULA NEEDS TO BE FOUND THAT WILL NOT COMPEL THEM TO CHANGE THE COMPOSITION OF THEIR FORCES OR TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF COMBAT TROOPS BELOW THAT OF THE WEST.

3. THE PROFESSOR, ACCORDING TO HIS STORY, THEN SPOKE TO OFFICIALS IN THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY. ON THE BASIS OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS, HE WENT BACK TO THE SOVIETS--IN THIS CASE USING THE OCCASION OF A CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR FALIN--TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING REPLIES:

--THE SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT GERMAN TROOP LEVELS IS MISPLACED. THE FRG WOULD NOT PLAN OR EVEN WISH TO RAISE ITS TROOP LEVELS EVERY TIME THERE IS SOME MODEST DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF TROOPS OF ONE OR ANOTHER NATO PARTNERS (FOR EXAMPLE, THE PROFESSOR TOLD THE SOVIETS, THE GERMANS WOULD NOT BOOST THEIR FORCES BY A FEW THOUSAND JUST BECAUSE THE DUTCH REDUCED THEIRS BY SOME  
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SUCH AMOUNT). FOR MINOR FLUCTUATIONS OF THAT SORT,

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

-----058998 231458Z /53

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9287  
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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY  
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

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THE GERMANS BELIEVE THEY CAN COMPENSATE BY IMPROVEMENTS  
IN NATO WEAPONRY. HOWEVER, THE GERMANS DO WANT TO HAVE  
THE FREEDOM TO ADJUST THEIR FORCES IN CASE THERE ARE  
MAJOR DRAW-DOWNS, SPECIFICALLY IN US FORCES.

--THE GERMANS CANNOT UNDERSTAND, IF THE SOVIET  
UNION APPRECIATES THE DESIRE FOR COLLECTIVITY, WHY THE  
SOVIETS IN VIENNA PRESENTED FIGURES WHICH SERVE ONLY  
TO RESTRICT THEIR OWN FLEXIBILITY FOR LATER NEGOTIATIONS  
ABOUT HOW TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENT SOVIET  
CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE  
SOVIET FIGURES IN VIENNA APPEAR TO BE INTENDED TO PLAY  
GAMES (MOGELEI).

4. ACCORDING TO THE PROFESSOR, FALIN'S DEMEANOR AND  
REACTION WITH REGARD TO THE SECOND POINT INDICATED THAT  
FALIN--AND PERHAPS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT--DID NOT ATTACH  
VERY MUCH SIGNIFICANCE TO THE VIENNA DATA DISCUSSIONS.  
FALIN INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE GERMAN POINT  
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AND DID NOT ACT AS IF THOSE DISCUSS, WERE CENTRAL  
TO SOVIET CONCERNS.

5. COMMENT: UNFORTUNATELY, THE NATURE OF THE CONVERSA-  
TION DID NOT ENABLE US TO LEARN MORE DETAIL ABOUT THE  
SOVIET PROPOSAL OR THE GERMAN REACTION. WE DO NOT EVEN  
KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT THE STORY MAY HAVE BEEN REPORTED  
ACCURATELY TO US. WHAT WE REGARD AS SIGNIFICANT ARE  
(1) THE SOVIET INITIATIVE TO DEAL WITH THE FRG  
BILATERALLY ON MBFR, THROUGH AN INTERMEDIARY PRESUMABLY  
INTENDED TO MAKE SUCH BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ACCEPTABLE,  
AND (2) THAT THE FRG MUST HAVE RECEIVED FROM THIS  
EXCHANGE AN IMPRESSION TENDING TO DOWNGRADE THE  
IMPORTANCE OF THE CURRENT DATA EXCHANGES.  
STOESSEL

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## Message Attributes

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**To:** STATE  
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